Working Papers
▶ Geoeconomic Coercion: Which Target, Who Pays? [Job Market Paper]
This paper studies the incidence of economic sanctions, across countries and within each of them. I document that sanctions have increasingly targeted firms rather than entire sectors, a substitution unexplained by geopolitical factors. I develop a two-country model of sanctions with heterogeneous firms, international input sourcing and oligopolistic competition. Competition with unaffected rivals limits the ability of a targeted firm to pass the sanction cost on to consumers, forcing it to absorb much of the shock through lower profits. A sectoral sanction raises every firm’s cost uniformly, and consumers bear a larger share of the sanction cost. In firm-level sanctions, maximizing the damage to the targeted firm compared to collateral damages requires targeting the largest firm in a sector. Simulations of the general equilibrium show that firm-level sanctions cost the target economy four times what they cost the sanctioning economy, against eleven under sectoral sanctions. A government maximizing damage inflicted per unit borne would therefore choose the sectoral design. Policymakers nonetheless use firm-level sanctions, suggesting that they also consider who bears the cost within the target economy.
▶ The Extraterritoriality of Smart Sanctions
Sanctions increasingly reach beyond their targets: senders threaten third-country firms and partners of sanctioned firms. Yet existing datasets record sanctions only by program. I introduce the Firms Sanctioned DataBase (FSDB), documenting the address and listing date of every entity the EU has sanctioned since 2001. One in four targets lies outside the country its program names, and $50\%$ could anticipate their listing from a partner's sanction, up to two years ahead. Dating sanctions to the whole program start date and in the target country erases their effect on trade. With entity-level timing and location, sanctioning one producer cuts exports of its products by $20\%$, and each additional sanctioned producer in the same sector by a further $17\%$. Ignoring third-country targets overstates these effects by 17 and 8 percentage points respectively. Across sectors, effects range from trade shutdowns to increases, and misclassification inflates this dispersion.
Work in Progress
- The Determinants of the Success Rate of Firm-Level Sanctions

